{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Kyiv Center for Defense Policy","provider_url":"https:\/\/kyivdefensepolicy.org\/de","title":"Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment October 6 2024 - Kyiv Center for Defense Policy","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"vPZ9o4Nk7e\"><a href=\"https:\/\/kyivdefensepolicy.org\/de\/2024\/10\/06\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2024\/\">Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment October 6 2024<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/kyivdefensepolicy.org\/de\/2024\/10\/06\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2024\/embed\/#?secret=vPZ9o4Nk7e\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8222;Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment October 6 2024&#8220; &#8211; Kyiv Center for Defense Policy\" data-secret=\"vPZ9o4Nk7e\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/* <![CDATA[ *\/\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/kyivdefensepolicy.org\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n\/* ]]> *\/\n<\/script>","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/kyivdefensepolicy.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/pexels-clickerhappy-9250-scaled.jpg","thumbnail_width":2560,"thumbnail_height":1704,"description":"Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the constraints in Russia's defence industrial production, limits to Russia\u2019s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver - ISW."}