In a report published on May 27, 2022, Meduza cited anonymous sources close to the Kremlin who said officials were again discussing a possible assault on Kyiv following Russian advances in Donbas. The report describes officials’ ambitions; it does not establish that a new military operation had been approved.<\/p>\n
Russian troops continue their advance in the Donbas region, raising concerns among Ukrainian officials warning of difficult battlefield conditions. Sources from Meduza indicate that despite the Russian army’s performance falling short of Moscow’s initial plans, the Kremlin is once again contemplating an assault on Kyiv, hoping for a full-scale victory in the war.<\/p>\n
Within the internal political bloc of the Russian Presidential Administration, optimism has resurfaced, fueled by the progress in Donbas. Kremlin insiders believe that Moscow could achieve victory in Ukraine within a few months. Meduza’s sources, close to the Kremlin and within the administration, suggest that the ‘minimum program’ for declaring victory involves capturing the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Currently, Ukraine retains control over about 5% of Luhansk and slightly more than 40% of Donetsk.<\/p>\n
The ‘maximum program’ remains the capture of Kyiv, although the initial assault on the Ukrainian capital ended in failure in March, with Russia withdrawing its forces and leaving behind evidence of numerous war crimes. Military experts have consistently argued that capturing Kyiv was an unrealistic goal due to insufficient Russian forces.<\/p>\n
Despite setbacks, Kremlin sources maintain that Russian leadership has not abandoned this objective. One insider predicts that the conflict might conclude by autumn. Previously, the Kremlin was more cautious in its assessments, acknowledging the challenges of ending hostilities while maintaining its approval ratings.<\/p>\n
The sentiment has spread beyond the Kremlin to the leadership of United Russia, with Secretary of the General Council Andrey Turchak frequently visiting Donbas and even raising the Russian flag in a Zaporozhye settlement. Sergei Kiriyenko, head of the Kremlin’s political bloc, oversees the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR, preparing referendums for their annexation to Russia, publicly framing the invasion as a fight against Nazism and fascism.<\/p>\n
Meduza’s sources are unaware of the Ministry of Defense’s current stance on advancing towards Kyiv. By late March 2022, Russian military leadership had accepted that Kyiv could not be taken with the limited forces deployed in the ‘special operation.’ However, there remains room for maneuver, such as deploying conscripts, although their involvement has been rare.<\/p>\n
A widespread mobilization is unlikely, as the Kremlin fears it could damage the authorities’ ratings and Putin’s personal standing. Additionally, there is skepticism about continued Western support for Ukraine if the war drags on, with expectations that Europe will eventually tire of providing financial and military aid.<\/p>\n
Public rhetoric about Russia’s goals in the war remains open to interpretation. The Ministry of Defense still cites the ‘liberation of Donbas’ as the main objective, despite Russian forces establishing control in Kherson and Zaporozhye. An order simplifying Russian citizenship for residents of these regions has also been signed.<\/p>\n
During the May 9 parade, Putin reiterated that ‘all planned objectives are being met’ and ‘results will be achieved,’ without specifying what these entail. Previously, he has mentioned ‘demilitarization’ and ‘denazification’ of Ukraine as goals, though their meanings remain ambiguous.<\/p>\n